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FOREWORD 
Papers presented in this report represent most of the formal part of 
the program of the fifth Ohio Dairy Seminar, held October 1-2, 1970. This 
seminar has been sponsored jointly by the Ohio Milk Producers Federation 
and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, in cooperation with the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University. 
Current and projected milk marketing problems were emphasized in this 
seminar, including regional cooperatives, product classification, the 
Class I base plan, pooling, bargaining, reciprocity, and standards and la-
beling. Previous seminars have emphasized the non-member problem as a 
bargaining limit (1966); merger of cooperatives (1967); dairy marketing 
policies (1968); and current dairy marketing problems (1969). 
The Planning Committee for this fifth seminar in the series included 
Sam Cashman and William MCNutt, Ohio Farm Bureau Federation; Donald Zehr, 
Ohio Milk Producers Federation; and Robert Jacobson and David Hahn, The Ohio 
State University. 
PURPOSE 
It is helpful to review the general purpose of this meeting and try 
to establish a few bench-marks. This seminar has traditionally invited a 
relatively small number of leaders rather than having an open type of meet-
ing. Leadership as represented by management and farmer directors have been 
invited by Ohio Milk Producers Federation and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation. 
The dairy marketing specialist staff of Ohio State University has provided 
guidance and served to coordinate the seminar. 
The purpose may be expressed in various ways but it involves the general 
subject of bargaining and the bargaining position of milk marketing coopera-
tives. In the past years we have attempted to lift up one or two subjects 
per year, all related to the question of how milk marketing cooperatives can 
provide the most effective marketing programs for the-ir members. 
The purpose has two points of emphasis: 
(1) To acquaint the two groups (OMPF and OFBF) with the current 
situation and problems in the markets and on the farms, 
thus enabling them to understand by communicating more 
effectively with one another. 
(2) To study, somewhat in detail, the one or two current 
problems facing the dairyman and his cooperative and 
suggest some methods of solving them. 
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THE COOPERATIVE'S VIEW ON 
PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION 
George W. O'Brien 
Economist 
Dairylea Cooperative, Inc. 
It would be easy for me to give the cooperative's view on product 
classification by simply saying "We're for it," and then promptly sitting 
down. However, I don't think that's what Don Zehr had in mind when he asked 
me to come out here to talk on this subject. He knows that I've been some-
what involved with classification over the last couple of years, having been 
on a National Milk Producers Federation committee which attempted to set up 
some guidelines for the Federal Order program. 
Early History 
It might be interesting if we first review some of the early history of 
classified pricing and then, how it has been used recently, where we are at 
the present, and where we might be going. 
I have to start out a little proudly here, because next May will be 
the 50th anniversary of the use of a classified price and pooling plan by 
Dairylea. To the best of my knowledge, the Dairymen's Leage Cooperative 
Association, Inc. was the first dairy farmer organization to sell milk to 
its many buyers on the basis of how the milk was used, with different 
prices for each such use, and then pooling the returns from all of these 
sales so that each member received the same average price for his milk. 
They started at that time with five classes of utilization. 
Class I was fluid milk. 
Class II was fluid cream. 
Class III was manufactured products. 
Class IV-A was butter, and 
Class IV-B was cheddar cheese. 
The price was for the whole milk going into these products. With 
practically all of the producers in the New York Milkshed being members of 
the Dairymen's League, the blend or uniform or average price brought a 
substantial amount of stability to the area. 
Purpose and Basis 
The purpose of the plan, of course, was to stabilize the market and 
improve dairy farmers incomes. It was recognized that good quality fluid 
milk on a regular supply basis was worth more to a handler than the seasonally 
produced milk that went into butter and cheese. The seasonal production, 
which tended to ruin fluid prices in May and June, contributed to the 
problem. 
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Today the basis for milk classification has been translated into 
economic terms such as elasticity of demand for roilk and milk products. 
This merely means that there is a relatively strong demand for milk for 
fluid purposes, and therefore it is possible to charge more for that use 
than for milk for butter. Why? Well, milk is considered almost a necessity 
for babies and children, and people will pay the price to get it. On the 
other hand, butter has a substitute in oleomargarine which limits the amount 
people will pay for butter. Butter is therefore the luxury item, so to 
speak, and fluid milk the necessity. Most other dairy products fall 
somewhere between these two extremes. 
Breakdown of Program 
This plan worked well for the Dairymen's League at the beginning 
until one large handler, the Sheffield Farms Company, objecting to paying 
the Class I price for milk, decided that an easy way to obtain a supply of 
milk for their fluid needs was to entice members of the League to withdraw 
from the cooperative by offering to pay them 5¢ per cwt. over the League 
blend. Unfortunately, for all the farmers, members and non-members alike, 
Sheffield, and then others, did get a supply of milk and the cooperative 
bargaining power was substantially reduced. 
Outside HelE 
It was at that point in time that state and federal regulation was 
sought by farmer organizations all across the United States as a means of 
assisting them in the marketing of their product with buyers in the 
marketplace. 
First, on the Federal level, was the triple A or Agricultural 
Adjustment Acts of 1933 and 1935 which were declared unconstitutional in 
1936. Then in 1937, our current regulation, the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act, was passed. This is the basis for all of the Federal Milk 
Orders that have been put into operation over the past 33 years. 
It was and is the stated policy of the Act to "maintain such orderly 
marketing conditions ••••• in interstate commerce as will establish ••••• 
as the price to farmers, parity prices •••• o"• 
From a small beginning the order system has grown into a large 
operation. 
In 1969, 144,210 producers had their milk marketed in Federal Order 
Areas whose population was 122.3 million people. The volume marketed 
was 61 billion pounds or 52.5% of the 116.2 billion pounds produced last 
year. The gross dollar value was $3,589,583,000. or $24,891. per producer. 
The number of markets reached a peak in 1962 with 83 separate 
Federal Orders. Last year, through merger, consolidation and extension, 
the number was down to 67. 
The improved marketing practices over time have accounted for the 
necessary changes or evolution of the order program. Having an impact 
on marketing practices are such things as: 
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1. The improved highway system. 
2. The improved methods of milk pick-up, bulk tank vs. cans. 
3. The improved packaging and distribution practices of handlers, 
such as plastic coated single service paper vs. bottles, 
and wholesale store distribution vs. home delivery. 
4. Today, handlers serve much broader areas, often over several 
hundred miles instead of just local retail routes. 
The order system has had to accommodate to the changes. Here in Ohio, 
such accommodation has taken place in the last few years, the most recent 
ones being the consolidation of the Northeastern Ohio Order, the Greater 
Youngstown-Warren order, the Greater Wheeling order and the Western part 
of Pennsylvania into one marketing area with the Clarksburg, w. Va., order 
added shortly thereafter in the Eastern Ohio-Western Pennsylvania Order; 
and the more recent merger of the Northwestern Ohio order, the Miami Valley 
order, the Cincinnati order, the Columbus order and the Tri-State order 
into the Ohio Valley Order. Previously unregulated territory was in-
cluded in each of these new orders. 
The Order Classification Situation 
The classification and pricing for individual markets were originally 
based upon the situation in the individual market. Generally, milk for 
fluid purposes that was required to be approved by the local health 
authorities was included in Class I. All other product uses, not requiring 
specific health approval, were put in the manufacturing class or classes. 
However, what was required to be locally inspected in one market and 
thereby included in Class I, was not necessarily the situation in another 
market. As the markets have been expanded or merged, because of and 
together with the increased mobility of milk, the inconsistencies among 
orders has created problems. The problem arises mainly when a product, 
fluid or manufactured, is shipped from one market to another. 
In an attempt to resolve some of these differences, the National 
Milk Producers Federation Which represents dairy farmer cooperatives all 
over the United States appointed a committee to study the situation and 
make recommendations for improvement. At the same time the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture had a committee working on the same subject. 
We found some strange situations among the markets. I'll list some 
of them. 
1. In 20 markets there were more than two classes of utilization. 
2. Eight markets classified fluid cream as Class II, the remainder 
had it in Class I. 
3. In 49 markets, eggnog was Class II. 
4. Twenty markets classified yogurt as Class II. 
5. Seventeen markets classified sour cream as Class II. 
6. Thirteen markets provided a higher price for cottage cheese 
than the basic manufacturing class price. 
7. Most orders exclude evaporated milk from Class I, but in making 
this exclusion the orders provided 26 different ways to do it, 
that is, there were 26 ways of saying in effect the same thing. 
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This latter problem has led to a court case recently, the results 
of Which have weakened the classification provision of the Middle Atlantic 
Order. In attempting to exclude evaporated milk from Class I, that is the 
regular evaporated milk in consumer cans, the order exempted sterilized 
milk or milk products in hermetically sealed containers from the fluid milk 
product definition. 
Half-and-half was a Class I product, but the Reddi-Whip Corporation 
of Philadelphia producing half-and-half in small tetra-pak containers 
claimed that they were sterilized and hermetically sealed and therefore a 
Class II product. 
The Market Administrator said "No, Class 1. 11 
The hearing examiner in a 15-A proceeding said "Yes, it's exempt from 
Class r. II 
The u.s. Department of Agriculture Judicial officer reversed the hearing 
examiner's decision stating that intent of the exclusion from the fluid 
milk product definition was for evaporated milk in cans and not to be con-
strued to include half-and-half simply because of the container it was in. 
The Federal District Judge in the third district reversed the u.s. 
Department of Agriculture Judicial officer's decision stating that the 
order language was perfectly clear and that any obscure interpretation not 
made clear to the regulated handlers would be considered entrapment. 
It is obvious from this that we have to be pretty careful in our 
selection of words, and mean exactly What we say. 
The Avoset Food Corporation has recently opened a plant here in 
Ohio and is selling sterile cream. This product can be marketed over a 
wide area of many Federal Order markets. Where cream is Class I, this 
product causes a disorderly competitive situation. 
The newly popular product of yogurt presents special problems, 
being Class I in some markets and Class II in others. One plant, the 
Carnation Company plant at Fullerton, Calif., distributes yogurt in 38 
states. In many cases the product is distributed through brokers or chain 
stores, never entering a milk plant. It is difficult for the Market 
Administrator to enforce the price provisions in such circumstances. 
Related Problems 
Along with inter-order problems caused by differences in classifi-
cation, are those resulting from price differences or mis-alignment. This 
has resulted from using different formulas in adjacent or nearby markets 
for pricing Class I or the manufacturing Class. 
For example, many orders in the mid-west use a competitive pay price, 
the Minnesota-Wisconsin Manufacturing Grade Milk Price Series as a basis 
for determining the manufacturing Class price. The Ohio markets, on the 
other hand, as well as those in several other areas, use the Minnesota-
-5-
Wisconsin price, but that price has a ceiling on it called a "snubber," 
based upon actual market values for butter and nonfat dry milk. During 
the past year, the actual Minnesota-Wisconsin price got more than 40¢ 
above the snubber. Today it is back in alignment. 
Different butterfat differentials in neighboring markets can also 
result in different costs to handlers even though the product ia in the 
same class. For example, the Class II butterfat differential in the 
Eastern Ohio-Western Pennsylvania market is based upon the Chicago 92-
Score butter price, and the New York-New Jersey market price is based upon 
the New York butter quotation. With the New York butter price averaging 
about one cent over Chicago, the butterfat differential between the two 
markets usually differs about one-tenth of a cent. When translated into 
the cost of the ingredients in a can of 40% cream, the difference is about 
30¢ higher for New York-New Jersey, even though the Class II prices are 
about the same. 
Our committee on classification recognized that we had to get away 
from reliance on health regulations as a basis for classification and 
move to a broader standard that would be applicable throughout the order 
program. The Marketing Agreement Act only provides us with the 
language "Classifying milk in accordance with the form in which or the 
purpose for which it is used." 
Actually the Department of Agriculture had already relaxed its 
reliance upon health regulations when it stated in a 1968 New York 
decision that '~ilk used to produce other fluid milk products for which 
handlers generally and regularly rely on local producers for milk supplies, 
which product competes directly with those fluid products for which an 
approved supply source is required, should be classified as Class I milk." 
In 1969 the U.S.D.A. issued a decision of Filled Milk. This is the 
product made from a vegetable fat and either skim milk or reconstituted 
non-fat dry milk. The decision, which is the result of a National 
Hearing on all the orders, put the skim milk or the nonfat dry milk, 
whether it came from order producers or from thousands of miles away, in 
Class I. It stated in part: 
"The form of filled milk and the purpose :fbr which it is 
used are the same as the form and purpose of use of whole milk. 
Filled milk, just as whole milk, is disposed of in fluid form. 
It is marketed by handlers in the same types of packages and 
in the same trade channels as the whole milk they market, and 
is mainly intended as a beverage substitute for milk." 
In a booklet describing the order program, the Department of 
Agriculture describes classified pricing as follows: 
"An order establishes prices by classes according to the 
use of milk. Because milk is perishable and is subject to 
contamination, there is extra cost of sanitary control on the farm, 
such as the expense of refrigeration and necessity of frequent 
delivery. Because it is bulky, there is a high cost involved in 
hauling it to market. This makes milk for fluid purposes cost 
more than milk for manufacturing purposes, and a higher price must 
be paid to encourage its production. Also, sales of fluid milk 
are fairly even the year round, while production is seasonally 
higher in the spring than in the fall. When producers deliver 
enough milk in the fall to meet fluid consumption, they generally 
deliver more than is needed for fluid uses in the spring months. 
The milk used for fluid consumption is priced at a lower level 
in line with the value of the manufactured dairy products made 
from such milk." 
Note the omission of any reference to health regulations. 
Recommendations 
The recommendations by the Federation Committee on Classification 
were general in nature so that there could be some variation by areas or 
regions to reflect specific marketing differences that may exist. However, 
we recommend the following: 
1. A common definition for "fluid milk product. 11 
2. Three classes of utilization with: 
Class I to be all fluid milk products. 
Class II to include all of the "soft" manufactured 
products such as ice cream, soft cheeses, evaporated 
and condensed milk, soup and candy. In addition, 
cream and half-and-half would be Class II, this to 
reflect the decreased demand for cream, to make it 
more competitive with the so-called sterile products, 
and solve the problem of trying to regulate sterile 
cream in Class I. 
Class III to include primarily the products under the 
price support program such as butter, nonfat dry milk 
and cheddar cheese. 
3. We would propose a single butterfat differential for all classes 
of utilization using 11¥% of the Chicago butter quotation. This 
will lower the differential for Class I for most markets, but 
this will increase producer returns since the butterfat content 
now in most markets, with the low fat milks, is below 3.5%. 
This would also improve the competitive position of butterfat 
and improve inter-market price alignment of milk ingredients. 
Incidentally, that 11¥% may have to be changed if the current 
Farm Bill is passed by Congress and signed into law by the 
President. The 11~~ as applied, reflects the difference in 
value between 1/lOth of a pound of skim milk as contrasted to 
1/lOth of a pound of butterfat. The Farm Bill will remove 
the requirement to support butterfat in farm separated cream 
-7-
so that in the future, under the dairy price support program, 
it will be possible to further differentiate in the relative 
values of butterfat and skim milk While at the same time 
remaining within the 75 to 90% of parity limitations. 
4. As to price of the three classes, we have already treated with 
Class I in the National hearing last January, where cooperatives 
from every market order in the country joined together through 
the National Milk Producers Federation in proposing an economic 
formula as the basis for moving prices up or down in unison in 
all the orders. 
For Class II we recommended a price of not less than 15¢ over 
the Class III price, but depending upon the situation in the 
specific market or region. 
We said that the Class III price should reflect or make 
allowances comparable to those used by the U.S.D.A. in 
establishing purchase prices for butter, nonfat dry milk, and 
chedder cheese under the price support program. 
The First Classification Hearing 
The first hearing to generally consider the classification problem 
was held in July in St. Louis and was for seven mid-west markets. Pro-
ponents were the three giant new cooperatives, Associated Milk Producers, 
Inc.; Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.; and Dairymen, Inc. 
Their hearing proposals followed closely the recommendations of the 
Federation committee, but deviated sharply on price. All but one of the 
markets was using the Minnesota-Wisconsin price series as the basis for 
the Class II price. Indiana was using the N-W price series, but was 
limited by the butter-powder formula as used here in Ohio and the Northeast. 
The co-ops proposed Class III at the Minnesota-Wisconsin price level, 
and Class II at 10¢ over that figure. 
This, of course, is of serious concern in the Northeast because 
practically all of the milk in the region is pooled in some order and 
substantial quantities, at times, is used in the butter, powder, cheese 
category. 
Frequently the competitive situation in the Minnesota-Wisconsin area 
causes the pay price for manufacturing grade milk to be artificially high 
relative to market values. As an operating cooperative, doing the balancing 
for the market, we make these products as required by the supply-demand 
situation. An artificially high price for milk used in these products, 
causes an operational loss and a payment or return to our members that is 
low relative to that paid by the proprietary handlers or bargaining type 
cooperative serving the fluid handlers exclusively. We recognize the need 
for balancing to promote market stability, but we are also interested in 
all producers sharing in that cost. Artificial prices do not increase 
producer returns, they only create disorder among producers because of 
producer price differences. 
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In the Chicago Regional Market, the relatively high price of the 
Minnesota-Wisconsin price series is used for the manufacturing class to 
discourage the association of too much milk with the market. The situation 
is therefore different than in the Northeast. 
Another thing that came up at the hearing were arguments that certain 
products should be Class III rather than Class II. These included such 
items as ice cream, evaporated milk and the cheeses such as Colby and 
Monterey Which are practically indistinguishable from cheddar. Some of 
the arguments were well founded and the answers don't come easy. 
The Ohio Approach 
While our committee was working and the problem of classification was 
being discussed, the U.S.D.A. was going on with business as usual, and 
here in the Ohio area a fairly important change in classification and 
pricing has just recently been included in both the Ohio Valley and the 
Eastern Ohio-Western Pennsylvania orders. 
Cream has been taken out of Class I and put in Class II. 
The fluid milk product definition (Class I) makes no reference 
to sterilized products in hermetically sealed containers. 
Class II, in addition to cream, includes cream and milk or 
skim milk mixtures down to 10.5% butterfat, yogurt, sour cream and 
sour cream products (dips), cottage cheese and cottage cheese curd, 
and milk to a commercial food processing establishment for the 
manufacture of packaged food products. 
Class III is the remainder, including frozen desserts, eggnog, 
frozen cream, butter, cheese, evaporated and condensed milk, nonfat 
dry milk, dry whole milk, dry whey and dry buttermilk. 
In pricing these products, Class II is priced at 10¢ over the 
Minnesota-Wisconsin price series and Class III is priced at the Minnesota-
Wisconsin price but limited by the butter-powder formula. 
Comment 
If Class II is limited to a few of the soft manufactured products as 
is now being done here in Ohio, then the pricing may withstand the rigors 
of marketing. However, if several additional products are included in 
Class II, I believe there needs to be a fairly close, calculated relation-
ship between Class II and Class III. 
In our particular market, the single true surplus product is butter 
and nonfat dry milk. The production of everything else is quite steady 
year to year, even cheddar cheese. We have considered the possibility of 
proposing only butter and nonfat dry milk in Class III with everything else 
in Class II. Currently, we are waiting for a recommended decision on the 
St. Louis hearing before taking up the total proposition in the Northeast. 
We recognize from a coordination or alignment standpoint that the 
classification and pricing approach will have to be fairly uniform 
throughout the order program. 
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Conclusion 
In my opinion, we would do well to continue to work together 
through the National Milk Producers Federation to arrive at a common 
approach to classification and pricing. If we can't make these decisions 
for ourselves, someone else will make them for us. 
We do need to maintain a sound basis for classifying milk, for much 
of the additional income that dairy farmers receive, over and above the 
manufacturing price, is dependent upon its continuance in the order program. 
I think it's safe to say that co-ops favor the continuance of product 
classification. 
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THE PUGET SOUND CLASS I BASE PLAN 
-- A CURRENT LOOK --
Hollis A. Hatfield 
Assistant Director, Research Division 
American Farm Bureau Federation 
The Class I base plan under the Puget Sound, Washington, Federal 
Milk Marketing Order No. 125 went into effect on September 1, 1967. 
We have, therefore, a market with three years of experience under a 
Class I base plan to observe. To date, Puget Sound is the only Federal 
Order Market with a Class I base plan authorized by the Food and 
Agriculture Act of 1965. 
In any review of the Puget Sound Class I base plan, it should be 
emphasized that the Puget Sound area is unique, as compared to most 
Federal order markets: that is, the movement of milk is deterred by 
Canada on the north, mountains on the east, and an ocean on the west. 
What is a Class I Base Plan? 
A Class I base plan apportions fluid milk sales among the dairymen 
shipping to a particular market based upon each dairyman's past deliveries 
to that market. 
Historically, most base plans have been "seasonal" plans designed to 
solve the short-run problem of annual seasonal variations in milk pro-
duction. Frequently confused with the Class I base plan, seasonal plans 
are designed to achieve an improved supply-demand balance throughout the 
year by reducing seasonal variations in milk production, rather than to 
give each producer a fixed share of the Class I market. 
Under the Puget Sound Class I base plan, each producer established 
a 11production history base" determined from the highest daily quantity of 
milk delivered during a designated period. An adjustment factor of 55.7 
percent, determined from the amount of milk needed for Class I sales plus 
the Federal Order reserve requirement, was then applied to each producer's 
"production history base" to determine the base to be issued to each 
producer. 
Example: 
Producer's "production history base" 2,537 pounds 
Adjustment factor .557 
Base issued 1,413 pounds 
Between September 1, 1967 (date base was issued) and December 31, 1969, 
the average size of base increased from 925 to 1,413 pounds - a 53 percent 
increase. This change, caused largely by the withdrawal of producers Who 
sold their bases, concentrated the issued base among fewer producers. 
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On September 1, 1967 there were 12 Puget Sound producers with bases 
of 5,000 pounds or larger and one producer with a base of 10,000 pounds or 
Larger. By December 31, 1969, these numbers had increased to 42 with 
bases of 5,000 pounds or larger and five with bases of 10,000 pounds or 
Larger. 
The argument is advanced by some that a Class I base plan favors the 
Larger and more adequately financed dairymen because of the capital 
~equired for the purchase of base. Although this argument probably is true, 
it is difficult to isolate such a factor from the general trend toward 
bigger and fewer farm units. 
It probably is fair to state that the Class I base plan, by 
encouraging some producers to leave the dairying business sooner than they 
otherwise would has accelerated the trend somewhat toward larger and 
fewer farm units in the Puget Sound Marketing Area. 
Under the Puget Sound plan, a producer's base (issued base) is 
frozen at the level determined when the plan was established. A base not 
subject to change is a "closed" base. Under a base plan with a "closed" 
base, the only way producers can obtain base is by purchase. An "open" 
base provides for a change in a producer's base on an annual, or some other 
predetermined period. 
The legislation now pending before Congress (hereafter referred to 
:ts revised legislation) provides for an "open" base with automatic updating 
each year. A bill introduced by a Congressman from the state of Washington 
permitted updating of base by a moving average or a rolling base. Either 
of these proposals would permit new producers to enter the market and to 
:tttain equality with established producers with respect to Class I bases. 
~nnual updating, however, using the most recent period of production, 
night cause a Class I base plan to be undermined as has happened to many 
seasonal base plans; that is, dairymen might produce increasing quantities 
of milk for the lowest classification use to protect their share of income 
from Class I sales. A rolling base would prevent such a situation from 
arising. 
The Puget Sound Class I base plan authorizes the transfer of bases 
among producers at the going market price. During the past three years of 
operation, Puget Sound producers paid an estimated average price of $10 
to $14 per pound of base. The revised legislation authorizes the Secretary 
of Agriculture to establish "terms and conditions ••• which wi.ll prevent 
bases taking on an unreasonable value." Such language injects a judgment 
factor that might lead to under-the-table dealings if the Secretary 
should attempt to limit the price of base to less than its economic value. 
Base and Blend Prices 
A Class I base plan does not add to or subtract from the total money 
paid producers for a given quantity of milk. In brief, the money is 
merely divided among dairymen in a different manner. 
Comparing producer prices during the first year of the Puget Sound 
base plan to the blend pricing method, the average return per hundredweight 
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for the total market would have been the same for all milk delivered 
(Table 1). If there had been a significant reduction for example · 
d d 1 . . d . ' ' J.n pro ucer e J.verJ.es ur1ng this period, as compared to actual deliveries 
there would have been a decrease in the total money paid producers. The' 
average return per hundredweight for the total market, however, would 
have been higher under both the blend and the Class I base pricing methods. 
Milk 
Base 
Excess 
Total 
Milk 
Class I 
Class II 
Class III 
Total 
Pricing 
Table 1. Producer Prices Under Base Plan and Blend 
Pricing Method Compared, Puget Sound Marketing Area, 
September - August 1967-1968 
Puget Sound Base Plan Price 
% of Price Value 
Total ($/ cwt.) ($/cwt.) 
60.94 5.68 3.46 
39.06 4.02 1.57 
100.00 $5.03 per cwt. 
Puget Sound Blend Price 
% of Price Value 
Total ($/cwt.) ($/cwt .) 
49.18 5.99 2.94 
36.25 4.10 1.48 
14.57 4.18 .61 
100.00 $5.03 per cwt. 
The classification system of pr1c1ng milk is not eliminated under a 
Class I base plan, nor is the method of determining handler payments for 
milk changed. The handler must account by classes for the milk used and 
must pay into the pool a sum equal to the volume used in each class times 
the respective class price. 
The Puget Sound Class I base plan provides that milk delivered by a 
dairyman be divided into two categories: "base" milk and "excess" milk. 
The producer received a higher price for base milk, as compared to excess 
milk-- the lowest use classification, Class III (Table 2). The amount of 
base milk a dairyman can market is limited; no limitation, however, is 
placed on the volume of excess milk that can be marketed. 
Month 
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Table 2. Prices By Class, Base, and Excess, Puget Sound 
Marketing Area; January - August, 1970 !/ 
Class I Class III Base 
Per 100 pounds of 3.5 percent milk 
Excess 
January $6.48 $4.25 $6.18 $4.25 
February 6.52 4.26 6.21 4.26 
March 6.48 4.27 6.24 4.27 
April 6.43 4.58 6.19 4.58 
May 6.45 4.58 6.16 4.58 
June 6.43 4.61 6.14 4.61 
July 6.46 4.60 6.13 4.60 
August 6.45 4.61 6.16 4.61 
11 Effective May 1, 1968, the number of classes for pr~cLng purposes 
was changed from two to three. Class II includes milk used for 
ice cream, cottage cheese, and condensed milk; Class III includes 
milk used to manufacture butter, powder, evaporated milk, and hard 
cheeses. Class II price is 25 cents per cwt. above the Class III 
price. The 25 cents is distributed to producers through the excess 
location adjustment; does not affect the base price. 
Many dairymen have the impression that the base price is the Class I 
price. Largely because of the reserve requirement in a Federal milk 
marketing order, the base price is lower than the Class I price (Table 2). 
Under the Puget Sound base plan, about 85 percent (annual basis) of the 
base price is determined by the Class I price. The price a dairyman receives 
for his base milk, therefore, is more accurately expressed as the base 
''blend" price; the blend price derived primarily from the volume of base 
milk used in Class I and Class III times the respective class price (Table 3). 
Table 3. Base "Blend" Price Computation 
Class I Sales 81.78% of base milk used as Class I 
Class III Sales 18.22% of base milk used as Class III 
Class I Price $6.45 X 81.78% = $5.27 
Class III Price $4.61 X 18.22% = $0.84 
Base "Blend" Price $6.11 
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Translating base and excess prices into prices by classification, 
a dairyman with a 1,413 pound base would have received the Class I price 
for 1,156 pounds and the Class III price for 257 pounds for the month 
the computations are shown in Table 3. 
A dairyman with an average daily delivery of 2,537 pounds and a base 
of 1,413 pounds for the month shown in Table 3 would have received the 
base price for 56 percent of his total deliveries (the Class I price for 
46 percent of his total deliveries). 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE PRICE 
The weighted average price is determined from the percentages the 
base and the excess milk are of the total producer deliveries. For example, 
in July 1970 producer deliveries in the Puget Sound marketing area were 
comprised of 52.61 percent base milk and 47.39 percent excess (Table 4). 
The base price was $6.13; the excess price $4.60 (Table 1). The weighted 
average price for all milk in July was $5.38 (Table 4). 
Table 4. Weighted Average Price Computation, Puget Sound 
Marketing Area; July 1970 
Base Milk 
EXcess Milk 
Base Price 
EXcess Price 
$6.13 X 52.61 
$4.60 X 47.39 = 
\-Jeighted average 
52.61% of producer deliveries 
47.39% of producer deliveries 
$6.13 
$4.60 
$3.21 
$2.17 
price for July $5.38 
In July, a dairyman who delivered a daily average of 2,537 pounds of 
milk received the base price for 56 percent of his deliveries; the excess 
price for 44 percent. His weighted average price was computed as follows: 
Base price 
Excess price 
Weighted average price 
$6.13 X .56 = $3.43 
$4.60 X .44 = $2.02 
$5.45 
Note that in the above example, this dairyman received a weighted 
average price for his milk in July that was seven cents per hundredweight 
above the average for the total market (Table 4). 
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Three Reasons For A Class I Base Plan 
Three reasons frequently advanced for a Class I base plan are: 
1. To reduce surplus milk production; 
2. To eliminate a basic defect of the blend pricing system; and 
3. To permit a dairyman to produce in line with his market's 
fluid requirements. 
Let's take a brief look at these reasons, using as our guide market 
statistics for the three year period the Class I base plan has been 
operating in the Puget Sound Marketing Area. 
******* 
To reduce surplus milk production is the most frequently stated reason 
for a Class I base plan. This reason is also a statutory objective for use 
of a Class I base plan under a Federal milk marketing order. 
The amount of milk delivered by producers the first year of the base 
plan was 30 million pounds below deliveries for the comparable period the 
year prior to the plan -- a 2.3 percent decline. Producer deliveries 
totaled 1,265 million pounds during the second year of the base plan and 
moved up to 1,344 million pounds in the third year - seven percent above 
the volume of milk delivered during the first year of the base plan (Table 5). 
Plant changes had only a slight effect on these figures. 
Period 
Table 5. Producer Milk Deliveries and Class I Utilization, 
Puget Sound Marketing Area: September-August 1966-67, 
1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70 
Deliveries Class I Utilization 
mil. lbs. percent 
1966-67 (year prior to Class I base plan) 
1967-68 (1st year) 
1,286 
1,256 
1,265 
1,344 
47.4 
50.6 
51.9 
49.0 
1968-69 (2nd year) 
1969-70 (3rd year) 
In the year preceding the base plan (September, 1966- August, 1967), 
the Class I utilization in the Puget Sound market averaged 47.4 percent of 
producer deliveries (Table 5 ). 
During the plan's first year, the Class I utilization averaged 50.6 
percent of producer deliveries - 3.2 percentage points above the comparable 
period in 1966-67 (Table 5) • This increase in the Class I utilization 
resulted from: 
A. The decline in producer receipts (2.3 percen~; and 
B. The increase in Class I sales (4.5 percent). 
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The Class I utilization rose to 51.9 percent in the second year of 
the base plan and dropped to 49 percent in the third year (Table 5). 
During the first eight months of 1970 the Class I utilization 
continued to decline, as compared to the same period in 1969, dropping in 
June to 39.9 percent; the first month below 40 percent in more than four 
years. 
Looking at producer deliveries in the Puget Sound Marketing Area for 
the first eight months of 1970, the increase of 7.9 percent above the 
comparable period in 1969 was pronounced. The increase for the u.s. 
during the same period was less than one-half of one percent (Table 6). 
Table 6. Producer Deliveries and Percentage Change, 
Puget Sound Marketing Area; January-August Period 1967-70 
Eight Month 
Period 
Producer 
Deliveries 
Percent Change From Prior Period 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
mil. pounds 
868 
847 
860 
928 
Puget Sound u.s. 
-2.4 
1.5 
7.9 
-1.5 
-1.4 
0.4 
Producer deliveries in the Puget Sound Marketing Area during the 
first eight months of 1970 totaled 81 million pounds above those for the 
comparable period in the first year of the base plan (Table 6). 
Dividing producer deliveries into their component parts, base and 
excess, base deliveries for the first eight months of 1970 were 2.5 percent 
below those for the same period in 1969; excess deliveries rose 24.5 
percent (Table 7). It is difficult to pin down why some producers continue 
to ship below their base. Under the Puget Sound plan, a producer does not 
lose any base if he fails to deliver his entire base in any one month. 
The revised legislation contains a 'may" provision for reducing a 
producer's base if the producer does not deliver his entire base. 
Table 7. Producer Base and Excess Deliveries and Percent Change; 
Puget Sound Marketing Area, January-August Periods 1969 and 1970. 
Change in Producer Deliveries 
Eight Month Producer Deliveries from 1969 
Period Base Excess Base Excess 
million lbs. percent 
1969 529 331 
1970 516 412 -2.5 24.5 
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Producers with no base~ approximately one-fourth of the dairymen~ 
accounted for over 25 percent of the total producer deliverll.e~ to the 
Puget Sound market during the first eight months of 1970. n1ese prooucers 
received the base price for an average of 18 percent of their delivei'i.rs:s 
and the excess price for 82 percent. Translating these figures to a Class I 
pricing basis, these producers received the Class I price for about 16 
percent of their deliveries. 
Under the Puget Solli£d plan, base is assigned to new producers for 
pricing purposes only. The revised legislation stipulates that within 
90 days after beginning delivery at the price for the low~st use 
classificationJ new producers shall be allocated base as dete~mined proper 
by 1;he Secretary of Agriculture. 
1be Class I base plan objective to reduce surplus milk production is 
based on the assumption that it is unprofitable for most dairymen in fluid 
markets to produce milk for manufacturing purposes. 
Regardless of the so-called new producer provision of the Puget 
Sound plan, the fact remains that the "excess 11 price is high enough to 
induce production for manufacturing purposes. With the excess price being 
largely determined by the price support level, the support level not only 
is high enough to induce production of excess milk, or overbase milk, but 
has undermined the base plan. 
Quoting from a recent California dairy publication on that state's 
base plan: 11 ••• the increase in the support price has upped the manu-
facturing milk price enough for most dairymen to think it is profitable to 
produce overbase milk ••• Without any doubt, the existing excess production 
will weaken the California Base Plan and probably deter any increase in 
price to procurers ••• 11 
******* 
To eliminate a basic defect of the blend pricing system is a second 
reason often stated for a Class I base plan. 
The Puget Sound Class I base plan, with its two-price structure, does 
eliminate the so-called subsidized production of surplus milk but it does 
not entirely prevent the increased production of other dairymen from 
lowering the base price paid a producer because the base price is a blend 
of the Class I and Class III or excess price. 
******* 
To permit a dairyman to produce in line with his market's fluid 
requirements is a third reason frequently given in support of a Class I 
base plan. 
The Puget Sound Class I base plan does permit a dairyman to produce 
in line with his market's fluid requirements by assigning him a base 
representing his proportionate share of the Class I sales during a stipu-
lated base forming period. The plan also permits a dairyman to increase 
his original share of the market's fluid requirements by the purchase of 
base. 
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Although the Puget Sound plan has met the test of this third objective, 
on close examination a major question can be raised: that is, at what level 
should a market's fluid utilization be to assure a dairyman an adequate 
income? I raise this question because the Class I utilization in the Puget 
sound Marketing Area for the first eight months of 1970 averaged 46 percent. 
Other Amendments 
The 1965 Act authorized bases for individual producers and associations 
of producers thus permitting a cooperative with its own base plan to 
maintain the same relationship among its members as to their bases if a 
Class I base plan were approved under a Federal milk marketing order. The 
revised legislation contains authority for only individual producer bases. 
The revised legislation contains new language stipulating the 
assignment of other source milk to various use classes shall be made 
without regard to whether an order has a Class I base plan. This language 
is interpreted to mean that Federal order markets with a Class I base plan 
can not down-allocate (change from Class I to Class II or III) packaged or 
bulk milk received from other order plants. 
Probably the major change in the revised legislation among those 
changes that I have not covered is what is known as the 11Zwach" 
(Congressman from Minnesota) amendment. This amendment provides that a 
dairyman upon becoming a producer under an order shall after 90 days be 
allocated base on the same basis as other producers. In effect, this 
amendment means that a producer after shipping to any Federal order market 
wjth a Class I base plan for 90 days at the excess price, shall be issued 
base determined from his production history on the same basis as producers 
under the order. 
Unlike the base plan legislation authorized by the Food and Agri-
cultural Act of 1965, the revised legislation stipulates that provisions 
shall be made in the order for the allocation of bases to new producers 
and to producers coming under the Zwach amendment. It would appear that 
any base plan developed under the revised legislation, unlike the present 
Puget Sound Plan, would have to contain authority for reducing producer 
bases if additional base should be needed to comply with the act. 
Summary 
In summary, my remarks can be boiled down to two points: 
1. The effect of the Puget Sound Class I base plan upon the 
average price received by producers 
A Class I base plan does not add to or subtract from the 
total money paid producers for a given quantity of milk. 
TI1e money is merely divided among dair~nen in a different 
manner. 
A study by the Market Administrator for the Puget Sound 
Federal Milk Marketing Order shows that for the period 
reviewed, 51 percent of the producers received a higher 
average price under the Class I base plan than they would 
have received on the basis of the uniform blend price; 
49 percent received a lower average price. 
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What the Class I base plan boils down to for the individual 
producer is a determination ocwhich group he thinks he will 
be in. 
2. Role of Price --
With or without a Class I base plan, price will continue to 
play the predominant role in balancing a market's needs. 
As one producer advocate of the Puget Sound plan remarked: 
11 If the excess price is at a level where a producer can 
break even or make a few cents, the surplus in this market 
will not be greatly reduced." 
Anyone who is serious about using a Class I base plan, 
authorized under a Federal milk marketing order, to reduce 
surplus milk production must give thought to how the 
excess price can be set at a level that discourages the 
production of such milk in large volumes. 
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WHAT'S AHEAD IN MILK MARKETING? 
Hugh L. Cook 
Professor, Agricultural Economics 
University of Wisconsin 
I want to begin this with a summary of the flow of strategic events 
in the dairy world and problems of the last two decades. The past is pro-
logue to the present and the future as well. My list includes, not in 
order of importance: 
1. The threats of shortages and of inflation caused by the Korean 
War. Then the dawning realization that the Korean War had little effect 
on dairy markets and worst of all high consumer incomes did not clear 
dairy markets. 
2. The question of what went with our out of state markets for fluid 
milk after the fall of 1948? Something must be erecting barriers, perhaps 
the inspection procedures, perhaps the federal order system through 
compensatory payments, for example. 
3. Gradual erosion of legal barriers such as in the Dean milk case. 
4. Reciprocal inspection. 
5. Impact of technological innovation such as: 
(a) Automation 
(b) Bulk tanks 
(c) Paper packages and gallon jugs 
(d) Milk dispensers and vending machines. 
6. Structural changes especially in retail·store handling. 
7. The bobtailer and the captive milk store. 
8. Impact of the private label. 
9. Price cutting and price wars all over the place. A development 
from this was the tremendous growth in number of federal orders. 
10. The development and near passage of a self-help plan. 
My list of problems and strategic events for the 1960's includes, 
again not in order of importance: 
1. The fact that Kennedy showed little signs of wanting to get a 
dairy program through Congress which warned us that the best political 
machines were consumer oriented. 
2. Growth in strategic importance of the President's Council of 
Economic Advisors. 
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3. The turn-around in milk production. 
4. The appearance of the conglomerate firm~ Borden lost interest in 
dairying, and national firms showed declining interest. This carries a 
dramatic message on who must create demand, as Gerald Quackenbush pointed out. 
s. The record number of mergers in all lines. History had seen 
nothing like it. 
6. The regional federations and mergers of coops. 
7. The renewed interest in farm bargaining, especially as evidenced by 
the Mondale Bill. 
S. The accelerated conversion to Grade A. 
9. New dimensions to the import problem. 
10. The build up of record surpluses abroad. 
11. The marketing of imitation and substitute milks as a practical threat. 
12. The first national hearing on milk orders. 
13. The astounding increase in investment required for dairy farming. 
There were transitional problems of course, but essentially we had 
adjusted to, or knew what to expect from, several of the things which 
occupied us so much in the 1950's. 
Now what are essentially the new concerns as we enter the 70's? Well, 
I expect most of them are things that surfaced during the 60 1 s but things 
we did not master or work out a satisfactory way with which to live. Again 
I shall not try to name these in the order of their importance. All of 
these things must be on the agenda and must be moved up or down and played 
in a higher or lower key depending on the support that we can get in the 
process of making public policy. They follow: 
1. To adjust to the rapid conversion of grade B to grade A. This can 
be done for example by (a) Orderly absorption of it into grade A marketso 
Devices such as the standby pool will be a big help. (b) Slowing down the 
conversion rate from Grade B to Grade A. Devices include a national order 
for all milk, worked out in such a way as to allow Grade B producers to 
share in Grade A returns. National milk boards are another device by which 
this could be achieved. 
2. To provide adequate funding of research and development, and 
promotion. It could be argued that farmer check-offs for this purpose 
should be mandatory. We know by now that the big national corporations 
are turning away from dairy products and we can no longer depend on them 
to carry the major part of the burden. 
3. To re-examine laws which inhibit new product development. We also 
should re-examine those many regulations which cause our costs of producing, 
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processing and handling milk in the U.S. to be about the highest in the 
world despite our vaunted efficiency. 
4. To improve price alignment among markets. I don't think we can 
do this just by dabbling with freight differentials out of Chicago. Ideas 
such as one national Class I price FOB the farm, with the handlers paying 
the costs of hauling, are working us in that direction. 
5. To work out some form of supply management Which seems just as 
necessary as it did when milk production was 125 billion pounds per year, 
though the form it should take may differ. A shrinking to 108 billion 
pounds in the next few years has been forecast officially but the decline 
in consumption and the rapid conversion to grade A will cause even 110 
billion pounds to give us trouble. Besides that the milk production trend 
may turn around, especially if we get a fall in beef prices. 
6. We need new pooling devices. 
7. We need new methods of financing on commercial farms. Investments 
in dairy farming are so great now that we must come up with new methods of 
getting the use of land and other resources into the hands of commercial 
farmers. The farm labor problem is closely related to this, as are 
problems of farm organization and problems of vertical integration. 
8. Nearly all our problems could be approached through the large 
regional cooperative. We have little experience with coops of this size, 
especially in milk. A great surge of energy will be required to make them 
fulfill the promise we have held forth. We have promised improved efficiency, 
more effective bargaining, more effective participation in the governmental 
process, greater equity for producers and such. We are blessed by leader-
ship with flare and imagination to put these big coops together but the 
pedestrian jobs still have to be done. There are new possibilities of 
systems effeciencies as a result of this new method for organizing the 
industry but we know little about them. Because of the regional cooperatives 
we now have a small number of decision making centers and decisions become 
possible that never were before. We can use them as the institution through 
which to reshape all our policies. We could use them,for example, as a 
method of administering the price and income program for the dairy industry. 
There is reason to believe that a national self-help program is far more 
practical now than ever before. 
Selected structural features of the dairy economy follows: 
1. Dairy farm numbers are falling rapidly. 
a) Tremendous increase in investment to eke out all possible 
from family labor. 
b) Fast yielding technology used up on medium and large farms. 
c) Elasticity of production response to farm price appears to 
be about oae•half what it was a decade ago. 
d) Grade A conversion. 
2. Phenomenal development in regional federation and merger of coops 
especially in the last six years. 
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They may be approaching same cross roads. 
a) As to further growth by merger. 
b) On processing. 
c) On manufacturing. 
d) Etc. 
3. The relevant market has greatly expanded in size. 
a) Procurement market in manufacturing. 
b) Procurement and selling market in packaged fluid. 
4. The number viable fluid processors has been cut in half in a 
decade. 
5. Chain stores heavily in manufacturing and processing. Perhaps 
20 percent packaged fluid now packaged by retail chains. May have to 
include captive processors to get that figure. 
6. Buyers for fluid packaged milk and ice cream no longer explain 
atomistic. 
7. Large national dairy companies and perhaps regionals to some extent 
are conglomerating. 
I expect that your program committee wants me to speculate a little on 
a few major questions of the day. Here are some speculations. 
a) Will the regional mergers slow down or begin to bog down? 
b) Who will package and handle fluid milk? 
c) Can the free rider problem be handled? 
d) Will we get a better relationship between grade A programs and 
those for milk used in manufacturing? 
e) Can the manufacturing industry substantially improve its efficiency? 
f) What may we expect by way of demand? 
Some people are predicting that regional mergers will slow down in the 
next three years. Will they? I think that the people who are predicting 
this may be using it as a way to persuade their members and perhaps others 
to take certain merger actions which they think are desirable. In other 
words, gather your roses while you may. They say, in effect that the Justice 
Department and the Federal Trade Commission have not proceeded against the 
regional mergers or any of their conduct so far, because of their assumed 
immunity under the Capper-Volstead Act, but that now that they are becoming 
large and the public is noticing them, there may be some reinterpreting of 
this immunity in the near future. 
Well there may be some slowing down but I see nothing ahead that I 
think should stop them. Coop mergers apparently have been viewed as 
voluntary actions of producers and not as a merger in the usual sense. 
Macintyre that was Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission in recent years, 
according to the reports I hear, was quite friendly toward cooperatives and 
toward seeing them grow either by internal growth or by merger. We don't 
yet know how Miles Kirkpatrick, the new Chairman of the FTC, may view them. 
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There is reputed to be some lawyers in the Justice Department who 
would like to see test cases brought under the Capper-Volstead Act not 
. ' necessarily to hamper merg1ng cooperatives, but to find out how certain 
actions might be interpreted under the language of the Capper-Volstead Act. 
You will recall that in the mid SO's the u.s. Attorney General issued a 
report Which included his interpretation of the immunity enjoyed by cooper-
atives under the Capper-Volstead Act. He concluded that section with the 
observation that in 50 years the Secretary of Agriculture had not found in 
any instance an undue enhancement of prices because of the actions of 
cooperatives. He recommended that the administration of the Capper-
Volstead Act be removed from the Secretary of Agriculture and placed else-
where in government. I suppose we may interpret this one thing that may be 
noticed by Kirkpatrick, the new FTC Chairman. From all I can hear, although 
I am not a lawyer, I can't find anything that will cause the leaders of 
these regional cooperatives including the federations to stop their drive 
toward regional mergers. With all the momentum that has been built up and 
considering the nature of the leadership, they, of course, would like to 
avoid direct confrontation with the Justice Department of FTC. 
Now there may be something other than law that will tend to hamstring 
the new regional cooperatives and slow down the momentum and that is the 
nature of their problems. The two biggest ones that I see are (1) the 
communications problem which I named above. They are working on this and 
I don't see anything about it that can't be solved, howbeit there are no 
good precedents for solving some facets of the problem simply because we 
never had consolidated coops on that scale before. (2) The non-member 
problem. This is a very very critical one at this time. For example, in 
several areas the new regional cooperatives had been unable to negotiate 
super pool premiums or indeed keep the ones they had because of the non-
member problem. To remedy this they are working on a bargaining bill and 
I would predict that with the force behind it, they may get one within the 
next few years. If they do get one of the type that some people are 
talking about, it will mean that if more than say 50 percent of the producers 
can be put together in a particular market situation then these may represent 
the entire market in bargaining with the handlers and that whatever price 
they may arrive at will be enforced by the Secretary of Agriculture on all 
handlers. A bill of this type could solve the non-member probLem. 
There is the very critical matter of who will package and handle fluid 
milk. The traditional handlers, the food chains, or perhaps the cooperatives. 
We have statistics which show that the large food chains are going into 
processing and manufacturing at an increasingly rapid rate. The food chains, 
be they the corporate chains, voluntary buying groups or cooperative chains; 
are now the major outlet for packaged fluid milk in the United States. They 
must handle 50 percent of the total packaged milk in the United States as a 
whole and nearly all of it in several major markets. Many people in the 
industry, indeed many of us who are academic specialists in milk marketing, 
feel a major concern over two problems that came from this: (1) whether 
the food chains will do as much to supply the demands that we know to exist 
as have the traditional handlers and (2) that they will not do much in 
research and development, promotion and even with handling the products 
adequately within stores as the traditional handlers have done. By 
adequately supplying the existing demand, I may use as an illustration the 
fact that the food chains would not carry on home deliveries. Many economists 
and others within the industry have said for years that the best way to sell 
the most milk would be to keep the very large consumer accounts on household 
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routes and let the smaller consumers buy from retail stores. We feel that 
this would maximize total sales. Howbeit you know the trends have been 
such that real competition on the part of the regular handlers has been 
focused on getting store accounts; they have in general done very little 
to establish pricing systems which would induce the large household buyer 
to have his milk delivered to his home. This is a fault of the industry. 
One way or another this problem will have to be resolved in the next 
decade. It is not so clear how it will be resolved. The traditional 
handlers complain that the screws have been turned on their margins to the 
point where there is no longer adequate profit to be made by them in their 
store sales. This, of course, tends to depress the margins for household 
delivery as well. We are seeing the largest of the national dairy dealers 
becoming conglomerated. They give as the reason the fact that dairy 
margins are so low and the fact that the merger policy of the federal 
government has been such that they could not use merger as a method of 
growth. 
I can see two things which may work in the direction of keeping the 
traditional handlers in the business of packaging and handling fluid milk. 
For one thing, most of the managers of the large regional coops would 
definitely prefer not to be in fluid milk processing and handling. They 
know that cooperatives have seldom done well in that field. For example, 
in Wisconsin since the early 1930's there have been about 30 cooperatives 
that have tried to go into the packaging and distribution business and 
only 3 or 4 are in it now. So I think the coops will do what they can to 
keep the handlers in business in preference to going into packaging and 
distribution themselves. In addition to this there are signs that the 
teamsters union will moderate their demands so that the regular dealers 
can reduce their distribution costs to something more nearly approaching 
the costs of the chain. I was talking with an executive of one of the 
large national dairy corporations a few days ago, and he went into some 
details about modification of labor demands and appeared very optimistic 
about it. So between these two things, I can see hope that traditional 
handlers will continue to package and handle milk. I can also see some hope 
that the traditional handlers will approach the problem of household 
deliveries with new imagination and interest. My hope here is based largely 
on what I have heard from Mr. Baumer and Mr. Jacobson of their research 
here on Ohio markets and also from what I hear of Hood's experimental routes 
in the New England area. 
I can see on the horizon that something will be done about the free 
rider problem on research and development and promotion. This may be done 
by a system of compulsory state checkoffs such as we are considering again 
in the state of Wisconsin or it may be done by the regional coops themselves 
if they can handle the non-member problem. If a bargaining bill were 
passed much could be done under that. Much could be done under federal order, 
as is done in the New York-New Jersey order. I suppose there are other 
alternatives, but something must be done and the need is becoming so 
critical that various approaches will be tried until something works. 
With the regional bargaining cooperatives now owning such substantial 
amounts of manufacturing capacity it seems likely that there may be more 
relationship between Grade A programs and programs for milk used for manu-
facturing, Whether it be surplus Grade A or B. This has been long overdue. 
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It may come in the form of a Federal Stabilization Board. It may come in 
the form of a Federal Milk Control Program. It may come in the form of one 
National Milk Order which includes Grade B as well as Grade A. I don't know 
what form it may come in, but I do look for a much closer relationship than 
has existed before. 
Within the next few years the biggest problem in manufacturing may be 
putting together under one ownership the tremendous volumes of milk 
necessary to take advantage of advanced technology. For example, let us 
look at the amounts of milk necessary to operate the size of plants that 
are technologically feasible. 
The practical size limit on processing plants depends more on volumes 
of milk that can be brought together at one location at a reasonable 
hauling cost than on limits imposed by the most advanced manufacturing 
technology. With fluid milk and ice cream, distribution costs impose 
more of a limitation than hauling costs. However, new technology both in 
hauling and distribution are changing rapidly together with new methods of 
organizing an operation. 
Examples of plant technology follow: 
1. Continuous churns can now make 6,000 pounds of butter per hour. 
Two of these side by side together with a soft printer can make, 
print and package butter for less than three cents per pound 
where butterfat from at least a billion pounds of milk can be 
brought together. 
2. Ice cream plants, fully automated, that will manufacture four 
to six million gallons of ice cream per year are now in 
operation. It is reported that these can make ice cream at 
lower cost when operated at 55 percent capacity than the most 
common sized plants when operated at 90 percent or so of 
capacity. 
3. Automated milk packaging plants that can package two million 
quarts per day are a practical reality. The savings in 
packaging costs will offset the actual transportation cost for 
packaged milk for several hundred miles. These of course are 
minor in total cost of distribution but could be important to a 
big multi-unit operation of a regional or national dealer or 
chain store system. 
4. Continuous cheese manufacturing operations make practical the 
making of 100,000 to 200,000 pounds of cheese per day in one 
automated plant. 
5. Powdering plants that will handle 500 million pounds of skim 
per year have long been a practical reality. 
Listing the above is not intended as an argument that all plants should 
be of such size for survival nor indeed for maximum engineering efficiency. 
It does, however, suggest that where milk supplies in a fairly dense region 
of milk production can be brought under one central management the posssi-
bilities of cost savings with the latest technology are very dramatic. 
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I expect per capita demand to continue to decline. Vigorous efforts 
will be required to slow down the decline and the prospect of reversal 
appears bleak. The national milk mirage from which dairy has always 
benefitted is passing away and I expect milk looks like any other food 
product to the younger generation. I don't expect a rapid turn toward 
synthetic products, but I am casting doubt that people will reject new 
products solely on grounds that they are non-dairy. 
Some people feel that milk prices should be held down to minimize 
consumer substitution for cheaper substitutes and synthetics. I can't 
see that the dairy industry can compete price-wise with the figures I have 
seen on the cost of substitutes. Margarine can be made and sold for profit 
at less than $.20 a pound. I expect that milk and cream substitutes can 
be made for less than half the cost of getting milk from cows. I would say 
to get a fair price for milk and dairy products, carry on vigorous research 
and development and promotion programs and that we will survive that way 
as well as any. Every industry in the world fears the substitution 
problem in one way or another. 
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LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
NEW DAIRY COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE 
Robert E. Jacobson 
Professor, Agricultural Economics 
The Ohio State University 
In direct response to the title of this presentation, there are two 
major implications to the increasing concentration of milk marketing 
cooperatives. 
1. The Class I price implication has already been obvious for some 
time. The current $6.75 and $6.91 Class I prices in the Ohio Valley and 
the Eastern Ohio-Western Pennsylvania markets are 26 cents and 25 cents 
respectively above Federal order minimums. With 50 percent of a milk 
dealer's operating costs tied up in raw product costs, this is a major 
and obvious implication. Neither increased supplies of milk, nor any 
possible adoption of an economic price formula for Class I milk are apt 
to back the cooperatives off of this premium pricing policy. 
2. The second implication is more intangible, is of a longer run 
consequence, and I advance it at this point in terms of a question. How 
far are some of these large, strong cooperatives going to move into fluid 
milk processing and distribution and become direct and powerful competitors 
to traditional milk dealers? 
To evaluate these implications in some detail, let's look primarily 
at three things: (1) the structure that dairy co-ops have moved into 
recently; (2) the objectives that these cooperatives are pursuing; and 
(3) some of the constraints that may finally limit the cooperatives. 
Organization of Dairy Cooperatives 
For whatever the reasons, cooperative marketing activity among milk 
producers has been and continues to be more important than in any other 
farm enterprise. The total business volume of more than $4.5 billion per 
year of dairy cooperatives accounts for about 75 percent of the over $6 
billion cash receipts to producers for milk and cream. Of all farm 
products sold by all cooperatives in the United States, milk accounts for 
one-third of the sales, thus ranking ahead of any other commodity. Grain, 
for example, is second, accounting for 22 percent of all co-op business. 
Some changes among dairy cooperatives during the 1950-1968 period 
are recorded in the following table. 11 
lf Statistics of Farmer Cooperatives, 1967·68, FCSRR-11, FCS-USDA, 
May, 1970. 
!!!!:. 
1951 
1956 
1960 
1964 
1968 
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Number of Total Business 
Dairy Co-ops Membership Volume 
1,928 814,000 $1,934,000,000 
1,762 800,000 2,543,000,000 
1,541 663,000 3,056,000,000 
1,393 561,000 3,524,000,000 
1,100 434,000 4,505,000,000 
There are essentially three things to observe in this table: 
1. The number of dairy cooperatives is down, reflecting concentration. 
2. Membership is down, reflecting the exit from dairy farming. 
3. Business is up, reflecting both (a) higher prices, and (b) a 
higher proportion that co-op members are of all dairy farmers. 
But the focus of all of the dairy cooperative growth and merger activity 
in the United States today is tied up in 3 or 4 organizations. For our 
purposes, we can think primarily of three of these merged organizations, all 
o~= of Ohio, and one federation, Great Lakes-Southern Milk, Inc., which 
fairly effectively blankets Ohio. 
Merged Groups 
1. Associated Milk Producers, Inc. •• at last count, stretched from 
Chicago to San Antonio, had 31,000 members, represented over 30 
former separate cooperatives, and marketed over 11 billion pounds 
of milk annually. 
2. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc. -- at last count, stretched from 
Minneapolis to St. Louis to Omaha, had 21,000 members, represented 
over 30 former separate cooperatives, and marketed over 7 billion 
pounds of milk annually. 
3. Dairymen, Inc. -- at last count, stretched from Louisville to 
New Orleans, had 10,000 members, included 11 operating divisions, 
and marketed 4 billion pounds of milk annually. 
Federated Group 
Great Lakes-Southern Milk, Inc. -- at last count, stretched from 
Detroit to Miami, included 18 member cooperatives representing 
34,000 producers, and marketed 13 billion pounds of milk annually. 
Dairymen, Inc. is a member cooperative of Great Lakes-Southern. 
In identifying these various groups, I have failed to mention many 
major dairy marketing cooperative organizations such as Land O'Lakes 
Creameries, Inc., and others. But my point has been to focus more directly 
on bargaining groups basically which have seen recent rapid growth through 
merger or federation. 
In summing up these consolidation activities, Glenn Lake, President of 
the National Milk Producers Federation, recently stated, "As a result of 
these efforts, seven cooperative groups can now speak, at least on some 
matters, for one-half of the u.s. milk supply. This is in contrast to more 
than 100 co-ops speaking for the same volume of milk and the same number of 
markets 5 years ago." 
-31-
The question for this discussion is, "Why this merger activity?" 
An expression of the two basic objectives of dairy marketing cooperatives 
helps answer this. 
1. To enhance the net incomes of producers, and 
2. To provide market security to producers. 
Al Ortego, the Economist for Dairymen, Inc., expanded on these in the 
recent NCR-70 seminar as follows: 
'~e recent merger, consolidation, and federation of producer 
cooperatives are part of a continual struggle for market power 
to countervail the power on the opposite side of the market. 
Producers desire to achieve an influence capable of counter-acting 
or coping with that of regional and national processing firms and 
food retailing firms. Better organization over wider areas is 
needed to influence the increasingly important activities of the 
Federal government." 
To say that the cooperatives have had recent successes in pursuing 
their objectives is at least partially correct. 
1. On price, for example, Great Lakes-Southern has gained sub• 
stantial premium moneys over what Federal order prices would have returned 
to them. In 1969, their premium money totalled $31 million; and in 1970, 
as Federal order prices climbed, their premium money amounted to over 
$22 million. 
2. On security, for example, the recent bankruptcy of a dairy on 
the Detroit market lead to payments of only 12 cents on the dollar for 
2 months milk for 158 non-members. Cooperative members supplying that 
plant got full payment. 
To enhance the net income to producers or, in effect, to bargain 
(or announce), co-ops know they have to control the supply of milk. The 
co-ops have had some things help the situation, and they've done some 
things to help themselves in controlling supply in recent years. The four 
things to consider here include (1) milk production, (2) merger-federation, 
(3) stand-by pool, and (4) full supply contracts. 
1. Milk production -- From 1964 through 1969, milk production in the 
U.S. dropped from 127.0 billion pounds to 116.3 billion pounds. No supply 
management programs or other restrictive type procedures were in effect. 
A combination of market forces was taking place. Cooperatives could neither 
take the blame nor the credit for this reduction in supply. But as milk 
production contracted, cooperatives found themselves in a much stronger 
position to control milk supplies. Now we are entering what appears to be 
a period of expanding milk supplies, and this could be a significant change 
in the bargaining picture. There still is no effective machinery available 
to limit total milk production. 
2. Merger-federation -- Merger and federation are ways to stop 
competing for outlets and thereby to coordinate supplies, i.e., control 
supplies. Federation has done as much as merger in controlling supplies in 
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some instances. I was impressed when I read a copy of the Temporary 
Restraining Order that Borden secured against Central Ohio Cooperative Milk 
Producers Association this fall. Borden stated, among other things, that 
they were unable to get any supplies of milk in spite of rather intensive 
solicitation. The cooperative's diversion action was successful. This was 
supply control, and Great Lakes-Southern, through its Central Ohio member, 
had achieved this. 
3. Standby pool -- The standby pool is an arrangement between 
cooperatives in markets that occasionally need extra milk (Ohio markets), or 
are afraid of getting outside milk dumped on them, and cooperatives in 
Wisconsin that do not have ready access to Class I outlets and thus have 
relatively low producer pay prices. Currently 2.25 cents per cwt. on all 
Class I milk in the participating deficit markets is being assessed to 
finance the standby pool. The basic intent, from an Ohio viewpoint, is to 
help keep control on other source supplies. 
This touches on a major policy problem in the U.S. dairy industry for 
the next few years. This problem concerns the transition from manufacturing 
grcJe milk to Grade A milk, and the integration of this milk into the 
prJcing system. Presently, 72 percent of the milk produced in the u.s. 
is Grade A, and this proportion has been increasing every year. Over one-
half of the remaining manufacturing grade milk is produced in Wisconsin and 
Minnesota, Expectations are that the remaining manufacturing grade milk 
will convert to Grade A fairly rapidly. How these new Grade A supplies 
might be handled in a price regulatory program is the major question before 
the Federal order program today. This is also the major question confronting 
dairy cooperatives, and they are currently attempting to resolve it through 
the standby pool. 
4. Full supply contracts -- The movement away from milk dealer 
involvement in direct milk procurement is getting pretty well documented. 
More and more full supply contracts, as the co-ops call them, are coming into 
the system. These contracts may or may not include service charges. But 
the point is, these contracts again are a means of co-ops getting on top 
of the supply situation, and they are therefore an important dimension of 
the bargaining program. 
Immediate Bargaining Limits 
There are two immediate limits on the bargaining front for dairy 
cooperatives. 
1. Their own agreement on growth. 
2. The non-member situation. 
As for their own agreement on growth, the following observations on 
the Ohio and GL•SM situations appear relevant. 
1. Milk, Inc. is pleased with its merger of January 1, 1970, and as 
it consolidates itself internally, further expansion is an obvious option. 
2. Nobody seems to have their finger on the pulse in the Columbus, 
Dayton, and Cincinnati areas, so no predictions are possible. 
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3. Great Lakes-Southern Milk has asked itself the merger question 
and as a federation, it can only preach. The 18 member cooperatives sa; 
they want to make some mergers, but they don't want to go all the way in 
a single merged organization. 
But some people are impatient about this pace. At their 1970 annual 
meeting, President John Moser of Dairymen, Inc., "expressed his impatience 
with those Who urge that local mergers take place within GL-SM before 
bringing all 18 dairy co-ops together in one marketing entity."~/ 
At that same annual meeting, Manager Paul Alagia reported completion 
of a study on the feasibility of merging Associated Milk Producers, Inc. 
and Dairymen, Inc. This recommendation currently is being discussed at 
special Division meetings of Dairymen, Inc. 
If this all sounds like some kind of merger fever, I think that 
describes in part the philosophy that some people in milk marketing 
cooperatives currently possess. 
But all of the merger activity has not resolved the non-member 
problem for dairy cooperatives. There's no union shop in dairy farming, 
so non-membership is a kink in the co-op's supply control effort. In the 
two major Ohio Federal order markets, it is estimated that non-membership 
is as follows: (1) In the Ohio Valley market, 14 percent of the producers 
do not belong to a cooperative; (2) In the Eastern Ohio-Western Pennsylvania 
market, 25 percent of the producers do not belong to a cooperative. 
While these estimates indicate that most producers do belong to a 
cooperative, it is a fact that the distribution of non-members, from a 
co-op point of view, is bad. There are a couple of historic non-member 
islands in the Cleveland-Akron market. And in Southeastern Ohio, a 
significant non-member problem is further aggravated by a splinter group 
of organized producers. 
If cooperatives don't have the members, they can't control the supply. 
So what are they going to do about it? One vehicle they've been looking 
to is Federal legislation, a la the National Labor Relations Act. In 
speaking to this point, one leader in a major regional cooperative recently 
said, "Unless Congress passe~ legislation which grants agriculture 
similar rights to those granted labor by the Wagner and other legislative 
acts, then merger activity among the larger milk producer organizations will 
probably be restricted within 3 to 5 years. Producer organizations and 
cooperatives in general are making a concerted effort to have a national 
agricultural bargaining act passed in Congress." 
Second Implication: Co-op Processing-Distribution 
Let me say something only briefly on the point of dairy cooperative 
involvement in fluid milk processing-distribution. This question sort of 
~/ Hoard's Dairyman, January 10, 1971, p. 34. 
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comes out of some trends we are seeing. For example, the census figures 
on fluid bottling plants in the United States listed 8,484 plants in 1948 
and 2,840 plants in 1969. In another dimension, 34 grocery chains have now 
set up their own milk processing plants (51 plants), and these plants do 
an estimated 19 percent of all fluid processing in the U.S. 
The question becomes, "Are the cooperatives going to move into fluid 
milk processing-distribution, what with survival problems among milk 
dealers and potential further shifts of bargaining power to food chains?" 
There is no explicit co-op policy available at the present time to 
help us answer this question. In some instances, dairy co-ops are involved 
in processing-distribution because they now are basically trying to recover 
costs from sunk investments. In other instances, co-ops have taken over 
the operations of milk dealers, more to salvage a market for the co-op's 
producers than to strategically involve themselves in these marketing 
functions. 
But in further responding to this question, let me read what 
Paul Alagia reported to the membership of Dairymen, Inc. on this matter 
at their 1970 annual meeting. 
" •••• Since it appears that vertical integration by retail and 
private labeling will become even more important in the future, we 
can expect further attrition by the traditional milk processing 
firm from the dairy industry. This means that milk will be 
processed and distributed by retail chains or by producer organ• 
izations for distribution through such chains. 
"Dairymen, Inc., believes that with its present bottling 
operations, it will be able to gain valuable experience so that 
it can better decide the road to take in the future with respect 
to the processing and distribution of fluid milk. It appears 
obvious that the current trend will continue. There will be 
fewer and fewer processor-distributor milk plants than there 
are today, and more and more retail chain processing plants with 
the result that the dairy farmer should anticipate getting more 
involved in the bottling business if he is to market his product 
all the way from the cow to the consumer. If, and when, producers 
are required to process and distribute their own production on 
a large scale, DI will have the experience from which to draw 
and to do the job properly." d/ 
~/ Alagia, D. Paul Jr., ''Report to Membership of Dairymen, Inc.," 
Dairymen, Inc. News, Vol. 3, No. 3, December, 1970, pp. S-6. 
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Finally, when does this all end so far as growth in size and power of 
dairy cooperatives is concerned? Let me advance three somewhat inter-related 
dimensions to this question. These include (1) membership, (2) public, and 
(3) legal. 
1. Membership - The leadership of cooperatives knows, but sometimes 
forgets, that it had better not get very far out in front of its members. 
Mr. John Gage, Legal Counsel for Mid-America Dairymen, recently spoke to this 
point in part, and he also indicated how tightly the relationship between 
members and the organization would have to be maintained. He stated, "The 
strength or guts of a milk marketing association's program lies in membership 
stability and in agreements which can and will be enforced in the courts if 
necessary to insure control over a sufficient volume of milk to continue an 
effective program. With this, an association can ride out the adversities and 
overcome them. Without it, it may be building on a foundation of quicksand 
regardless of its assets and membership equities. Any serious legal problem 
or setback may cause membership erosion, which could snowball very rapidly. 
The terms and enforcement of membership and marketing agreements are 
highly important, and the same applies to other agreements such as hauling 
contracts which give control and continuity to the milk marketing program. It 
should be kept in mind that many associations have in the past been held to-
gether largely by local pride, but that this factor may have a reverse twist 
in large regional associations for a while at least." ':!_/ 
The question for the co-ops here is, "Can we get too big to maintain mem-
bership stability?" 
2. Public - In referring to the public as a type of limit on the power 
of cooperatives, I'm basically thinking of consumerism at this point. Already, 
the Federal order program has come under some scrutiny by consumer spokesmen 
(Nader). Classified prices with higher Class I prices in a sense discriminat-
ing against low income consumer, are a part of this question. With increasing 
emphasis on the nutrition question, this type of economic price discrimination 
may be subject to further inquiry. The question this generates for our dis-
cussion is, '~ow long could large cooperatives stand in the cross-fire if con-
sumerism should start analyzing the monopoly powers of cooperatives together 
with their Capper-Volstead exemption in the sensitive area of food price?" 
3. Legal - While the legal limits on cooperative power continue to be 
subject to question, the following relatively definitive statement on this from 
the FTC indicates current policy, particularly with respect to co-op mergers: 
" ..• it would seem that the cooperatives relative immunity from the anti-
trust laws has become increasingly narrow. The case law has generally tended 
to examine the facts in each case despite the strong arguments of cooperative's 
counsel that to do so violates a sacred precinct of cooperative activity. 
':!_/ Gage, John c., "How To Steer Clear of Legal Reefs in the Uncharted Future", 
Proceedings of 25th Annual Midwest Milk Marketing Conference, University of 
Missouri, April, 1970, p. 45. 
-36-
Should this trend continue and should such a merger among cooperatives occur 
in a competitive setting clearly indicative • • • of a substantial lessening 
of competition •.. , then I believe that it is not at all inconceivable that 
a Section 7 (anti-merger) case based on a strictly inter-cooperative merger 
might be undertaken. Although this may sound like heresy, I think that you 
would agree that even with cooperatives, an anti-competitive effect could re-
sult from a particular merger. If and when such an effect is the product of 
an inter-cooperative merger, I believe the parties will be hard pressed to 
argue that the Congress ••• in the Capper-Volstead Act, intended to protect 
circumstances detrimental to competition. 11 2._/ 
In summary, we've talked about a lot of growth and power and about some 
limits on growth and power. The member situation, the non-member situation, 
public reaction, and legal considerations are basic dimensions of this activ-
ity. The only safe prediction at this point is that the pace of action and 
reaction on dairy cooperative growth in these next few years is certainly not 
going to be on the quiet side. 
~./ Boyd, Wi 11 iam J. , Jr • , "Mergers and Cooperatives 11 , Proceedings of 24th 
Midwest Milk Marketing Conference, University of Kentucky, April, 1969, 
p. 5. 
